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The Implementation of FDA Determinations in
Litigation: Why Do We Defer to the PTO but Not
to the FDA? *
William G. Childs**
In early 1987, a scientist working in the research laborato
ries of MegaPharma Co., a pharmaceutical company, discov
ered a molecule that she believed would be an effective treat
ment for depression. Early preclinical work was promising.
Therefore, her company's patent lawyers filed an application in
her name in late 1987 for a patent to be assigned to the com
pany.
The prosecution of the patent lasted for twenty-one
months, and the prosecution history came to fill close to half a
banker's box. The patent examiner focused on three pieces of
prior art that he initially suggested might render the claimed
invention obvious. After correspondence was exchanged on this
topic of obviousness, the examiner became convinced that the
molecule was, in fact, a patentable invention - that it was use
ful, new, obvious, and enabled. 1 The patent issued in 1989.
The patent prosecution process, excluding the actual discovery
of the molecule, took approximately eighty hours of work by the
inventor and MegaPharma's inside patent counsel, and about
twenty hours by the patent examiner.
Meanwhile, MegaPharma decided the molecule, a member
of the class of drugs known as selective serotonin reuptake in
* This article is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu.

** Assistant Professor (as of August 2004), Western New England College
School of Law. Thanks to Mark Lemley and David Anderson for their com
ments on drafts, and to audiences at the Western New England College School
of Law, the University of Cincinnati College of Law, the University of South
Carolina School of Law, and the Northern Illinois University College of Law.
Thanks also to the editors at the Minnesota Intellectual Property Review for
their thoughtful comments and editing. Errors naturally remain mine. I ac
knowledge the support of Williams & Connolly LLP in preparing this article.
This article does not necessarily reflect the views of either Williams & Con
nolly or its clients. I am grateful to Dena, Ella, and Liam Childs for their sup
port and patience.
1 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (utility), 102 (novelty), 103 (non-obviousness), & 112
(enablement) (2000); see generally Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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hibitors ("88RIs"), had the potential to make a splash in the
multi-billion dollar market for safe and effective treatments for
depression. Though there were several other 88RIs already on
the market, MegaPharma's marketing department concluded
that the drug would fit into a small but profitable niche, serv
ing as the "cost-effective 88RI". Accordingly, the company's
management approved the drug's development.
The preclinical work began in early 1988, and consisted of
standard in vitro and in vivo studies considering toxicity, ab
sorption, metabolism, and excretion. 2 These early studies pro
vided a foundation of information from which later trials would
be developed. The company decided, based on these early re
sults, to file an Investigational New Drug application ("IND").3
The IND provides the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
with a pharmacological profile of the drug, results of acute toxi
cology studies in at least two species of animals, and the results
of short-term toxicity studies. 4 The FDA did not oppose the
IND within thirty days, and it was thus approved in early
1991. 5
The first Phase I and Phase II clinical trials began shortly
thereafter. Phase I trials, with twenty to eighty healthy volun
teers, are used to evaluate safety, to further determine a dos
age range, and to identify side effects. 6 Phase II trials, com
mencing somewhat later, include between one and three
hundred participants, and help determine the medicine's effi
cacy and provide further data on its safety.7
The data from these Phase I and II trials raised no signifi
cant concerns with respect to the medicine's safety profile,
though they confirmed that, as with other 88RIs, the medicine
seemed to cause headaches and tremor. The data also indi
cated an efficacy profile similar to other 88RIs. Thus, with
preclinical data and data from the Phase I and II clinical trials,
See FDA, The Beginnings: Laboratory and Animal Studies,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/aboutlwhatwedo/testtube-3.pdf (last visited Dec. 15,
2003).
3 See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Frequently Asked Questions

2

on

Drug

Development

and

Investigational

New

Drug Applications,

http://www.fda.gov/cder/aboutlsmallbiz/faq.htm (last visited June 2, 2003).

See id.
See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, supra note 3.
6 See National Library of Medicine, ClinicalTrials.gov, Linking Patients to
Medical Research, http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ctlinfo/whatis (last visited
4

5

June 2, 2003).
7

See id.
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MegaPharma's scientists were approved to go forward with
Phase III trials. Phase III trials involve much larger popula
tions, one to three thousand volunteers, and research further
the drug's safety and efficacy.s
At this point, the drug was named Phelox for marketing
purposes. It was ultimately tested in eight thousand patients, a
number comparable to other SSRI clinical trials. As with the
Phase I and Phase II trials, no significant issues were identi
fied from a safety perspective; and Phelox appeared to be com
parable to other SSRls in its efficacy. Based on thesedata,
MegaPharma filed a New Drug Application (liNDA"), seeking
the FDA's permission to market Phelox for the treatment of
depression.
Phase III trials indicated that a slightly higher percentage
of people taking Phelox experienced tremor than those taking
placebo or comparator SSRls. However, this difference was not
statistically significant. Neither MegaPharma nor the FDA
considered the difference to be of importance and, after eight
years of preclinical and clinical trials, Phelox was approved for
marketing in 1999. Phelox's label, as agreed upon with the
FDA, contained a warning regarding tremor as a side effect of
the class of SSRls, including Phelox. However, the labeling did
not indicate, nor did MegaPharma believe, that it occurred any
more often with Phelox than with other SSRIs.
The preclinical and clinical research involved thousands of
hours of work by MegaPharma employees. Furthermore, hun
dreds of hours of work by a team of FDA scientists and doctors
were required for FDA approval. In the end, Megapharma
spent almost $500 million in development costs.
MegaPharma launched an aggressive marketing campaign
in support of Phelox, emphasizing its low cost and its appropri
ateness for patients without insurance. The marketing efforts
included a substantial direct-to-consumer component, including
television advertisements urging patients to seek treatment for
depression and trumpeting Phelox's relatively low price. Its ef
forts paid off quickly, as the medicine rapidly achieved a five
percent market share that continued to grow consistently.
MegaPharma's success received the attention of a small
generic drug company, GenerDrugs. In early 2003, Gener
Drugs decided that the three pieces of prior art considered im
portant by the patent examiner rendered Phelox obvious. Con
8

See id.
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sequently, it submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application
("ANDA"), as provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act. 9 As part of
this ANDA, GenerDrugs included what is known as a "Para
graph IV' certification that the brand name company (i.e.,
MegaPharma) held no valid patents that were infringed by the
proposed generic equivalent of Phelox.lO
MegaPharma
promptly filed suit against GenerDrugs for patent infringe
ment.
At the same time that the generic drug company decided it
was interested in Phelox, so, too, did a group of Mississippi
plaintiffs' lawyers who specialized in lawsuits against pharma
ceutical companies. An article published in a peer-reviewed
medical journal noted that an HMO had examined its mem
bers' data on various SSRls. The efficacy data for Phelox was
comparable to those for other SSRls. However, the lawyers no
ticed in the adverse event data that substantially more Phelox
patients complained of tremor than patients taking other
SSRls. At the same time, an article was published in a second
medical journal that provided theoretical support for a link be
tween SSRls and Parkinson's disease, noting in particular that
tremor is a possible early warning sign of Parkinson's.
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b
(1994); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 note, 355, 360cc (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); 35
U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (1994» [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act].
10 The Hatch-Waxman Act provides for this approach when a generic company
believes that a patent involving a brand-name drug is either not infringed by
the generic or not valid. See 21 U.S.C. § 355G)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2000). The Para
graph IV certification puts the brand-name company on notice of the generic
drug company's intent to make a bioequivalent drug, and creates federal ju
risdiction for a lawsuit against the generic manufacturer. See id. If the
brand-name company files suit within forty-five days, the FDA approval is
stayed for thirty months. See § 355G)(5)(B)(iii). At the end of the process, if
the generic drug manufacturer obtains the right to market the drug, it will
have a 180-day exclusivity period. See § 355G)(5)(B)(iv).
Despite the fact that most patent infringement suits carry a jury right, there
is no established right to a jury trial when suit is brought under the Hatch
Waxman Act. See Brian D. Coggio & Sandra A. Bresnick, The Right to a Jury
Trial in Actions Under the Waxman-Hatch Act, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 259, 275
(1997). It is not clear whether a judge could permit a jury trial if requested by
the parties. It is also not clear whether the lack of a jury right would be up
held if constitutionally challenged. Thus, the hypothetical is in some sense
fictional as it would be extremely uncommon for a generic drug dispute to be
tried before a jury. The presumption of validity certainly still applies when
the issue is tried to a judge. This minor fiction is not particularly important,
as most patent litigation remains in front of juries, and the hypothetical pro
vides a useful way to compare directly the value of the agency actions in ques
tion.
9
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The Mississippi lawyers moved into action, rapidly signing
up plaintiffs through television and newspaper ads suggesting
that Phelox patients "may be at an increased risk of Parkin
son's disease - and MegaPharma should pay." Hundreds of
plaintiffs, some with Parkinson's and many without, signed up
within weeks, and the first lawsuit was filed two weeks after
the articles appeared.
MegaPharma thus faced a situation where it had what can
colloquially be referred to as two government licenses, one to
exclude others from using its molecule and one to sell the medi
cine containing that molecule as "safe and effective." It also
faced two close-call cases, where its attorneys advised that the
odds were roughly even that a jury would find either its patent
invalid or its drug to be unsafe. What do these licenses get
MegaPharma?
Its patent gets MegaPharma a presumption of validity,
such that the accused infringer must prove invalidity by clear
and convincing evidence. l l The accused infringer can also
prove the patent unenforceable if it can show inequitable con
duct, once again by clear and convincing evidence. 12 On the
other hand, in the tort litigation, MegaPharma gets an oppor
tunity to tell the jury about the FDA's approval. However,
Megapharma gets no presumption, no increased burden of
proof, nor an instruction that FDA approval should be consid
ered as relevant in determining design, marketing defect, or
assessing punitive damages.
This article examines the possible inequity of the treat
ment of licensees' rights in tort litigation in comparison to pat
ent rights in patent litigation. In particular, this article pre
sents the presumptions afforded from issued patents as a valid
model for the proper treatment of FDA approval in litigation.
Presently, most academic discussion proposes either preclusion
of tort claims or leaving the system more or less as it stands.
This article, on the other hand, proposes a middle ground.
This article begins by examining the differences between
the USPTO and the FDA. In particular, the quantity and qual
ity of the review provided by each agency is explored along with
the purposes of that review. The article then turns to a more
complete examination of how a patent or FDA approval is
11 See, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); see also, e.g., Neff Instrument Corp. v. Cohu
Elecs., Inc., 298 F.2d 82, 86 (9th Cir. 1961).
12 See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., 162 F.3d
1113, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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treated in litigation, both in principle and in practice. The ad
vantages to the patent-holder include evidentiary presumptions
as well as instructions from the judge regarding those pre
sumptions.
With the factual scenario and the differences in treatment
established, this article next looks to why the treatments of the
agency determinations in question differ in these contexts.
Presently, the patent holder is positioned to benefit from
USPTO mistakes (i.e., an erroneous grant of a patent) more
than the manufacturer of an FDA-approved medicine will bene
fit from an FDA mistake (i.e., approval of an unsafe or ineffec
tive drug). In other words, in a comparably close case (as the
hypothetical case above is intended to represent), a patent
holder will win while a holder of an FDA approval will lose.
A determination of whether this difference in advantages
is appropriate can be made only through examination of the in
terests at issue. As an initial matter, this article examines
government interests including ensuring that determinations
made by the USPTO or FDA are accurate and implemented
appropriately. Also examined are the individual and societal
interests furthered by patent litigation and product liability
litigation. In patent litigation, courts seek to protect proper
patent monopolies while preventing improper ones (i.e., those
based on invalid or unenforceable patents). In the pharmaceu
tical context, courts seek to protect citizens from unsafe drugs
while avoiding imposing unwarranted liability on drug produc
ers. Whether these interests are, or are not, furthered through
a variety of procedural mechanisms is a critical matter when
determining if those mechanisms are appropriate.
After exploring the USPTO and FDA in comparison to each
other, this article lays out the present posture of the debate on
how to treat FDA approval in litigation. The bulk of discussion
can be categorized into two areas: one urging preclusion of tort
liability if the defendant complied with relevant regulatory re
quirements and another opposing such preclusion and leaving
the system as it stands, with some incremental institutional
changes.
Concluding remarks demonstrate that a juxtaposition of
the USPTO and FDA processes indicates that FDA approval
should receive at minimum the deference in litigation that an
issued patent receives. Therefore, this article proposes a pre
sumption of safety and efficacy for FDA-approved drugs. With
the outlines of the proposed presumption established, the arti
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cle further considers the presumption in the context of the con
cerns raised by the various commentators in the regulatory
compliance defense debate. Finally, the article concludes that a
presumption from FDA licensing addresses these concerns bet
ter than the proposals made by commentators to date. 13
1. HOW PATENTS ARE GRANTED (OR AREN'T) AND HOW
FDA APPROVALS ARE GRANTED (OR AREN'T)
A.PATENTIsSUANCE

By its own terms, "[t]he role of the USPTO is to grant pat
ents for the protection of inventions." 14 In 2001, 345,732 appli
cations were received by the USPTO and 183,975 patents were
granted. 15 At the same time, the USPTO has roughly 3,500
patent examiners.16 Thus, each examiner reviews roughly 50
patents per year, or one patent per week.
The patent process begins, unsurprisingly, with a patent
application,17 This document, typically 50 to 100 pages long,
13 Although it is not central to this article, the argument presented would
support a conclusion that the treatment of the respective agencies' decisions
should in fact be reversed; the presumption of validity should be eliminated
while a presumption of safety and efficacy should be implemented. The impli
cations of this article in the patent context will have to be fully explored an
other day, though they are referenced in part below.
14 United States Patent and Trademark Office, General Information Concern
ing Patents, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/generallindex.htm1 (last
visited June 4, 2003) [hereinafter General Information].
15 United States Patent and Trademark Office,
Patent Statistics, Calen
dar Years 1963-2001, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/ta£l
us_stat.pdf (last visited June 4, 2003) [hereinafter Patent Statistics]. The
length of the application process presently averages 24 months. See United
States Patent and Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability Report
for Fiscal year 2002, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/200211
58.pdf (last visited June 4, 2003) [hereinafter Performance and Accountability
Report]. Because of this lengthy application process, these numbers are not
directly comparable. In 1999, when many of the 20m-issued patents were
likely applied for, 288,811 applications were received. See Patent Statistics,
supra note 15. The USPTO states that approximately two of three patent ap
plications result in an issued patent. See General Information, supra note 14.
This proportion significantly overstates the rejection rate due to the unique
role of continuations and continuations-in-part in the U.S. patent system. See
generally Cecil D. Quillen & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Applica
Patent and Trademark Office, 11 FED. CIR.
tions and Performance of the
B.J. 1, 9-13 (2001) (concluding that the true "grant rate" is roughly 85 percent
and the true" allowance rate" is 92 percent).
16 See Performance and Accountability Report, supra note 15, at 9.
17 See General Information, supra note 14.

u.s.

u.s.
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includes a variety of administrative materials and a substan
tive portion that usually includes the patent's proposed title,
cross-referenced patents and patent applications, other rele
vant references, the invention's background, a summary of the
invention, the specification, the claims of the patent, and draw
ings when appropriate. IS The application's purpose is to pro
vide the examiner, and later the public, with a clear delineation
of the claimed invention. 19
Nearly all proceedings before the USPTO are ex parte. 20
Therefore, except in limited circumstances, there is no advocate
for those parties who assert that a patent is invalid. Indeed,
for the first eighteen months, the application is itself secret. 21
During examination of an application, the applicant must dis
close known relevant prior art, and the examiner does research
for additional prior art.22 Although the applicant and examiner
are allowed to present arguments to one another, the adversar
ial system with which most litigants are familiar is almost en
tirely absent.
Once the application is received, it is assigned to a patent
examiner.23 The examiners are divided into a variety of spe
cialties and subspecialties. 24 While the precise qualifications
vary by field, in general, patent examiners are required to have
an undergraduate degree in a relevant field. 25 Additionalongo
ing training is provided as well,26 The turnover in the ranks of
patent examiners is an ongoing concern for the USPTO.27 In
recent years, it has been viewed as a victory for attrition to be
down to seven percent annually.2s
18

See id.

19 See id.
See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 269 F.3d 1369, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (Mayer, C.J., dissenting in part).
21 See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000). Applications filed only in the United States
and submitted prior to November 29, 2000, are permanently secret. See id.
22 See General Information, supra note 14.
20

23

24

See id.
See id.

United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Examiner Recruitment,
Qualifications, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpalohrljobs/

25

qualifications.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Examiner Recruitment,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/aclahrpa/ohr/jobs/training.htm
Training,
(last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
27 Cf, Performance and Accountability Report, supra note 15, at 22 (describing
improvements in attrition numbers).
26

28

See id.
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The initial review of the application results in the first of
fice action. 29 The time between submission and the first office
action is carefully tracked by the USPTO as part of its efforts to
improve its efficiency.3o At last report, this time period aver
ages 16.7 months. 31 The first office action can be a grant of the
patent or a rejection based on any of the conditions for pat
entability.32 If the patent is rejected, the applicant will have an
opportunity to respond by either amending claims or making
arguments as to why the examiner's position is incorrect. 33
Even if the claim language is not amended, the statements
made in this process, called the prosecution history, can limit
how the patent is eventually construed. 34 In a complex patent
application, the prosecution history may consist of several
boxes, while in a more straightforward application, it may con
sist of just a folder.
After the response to the first office action, the patent ex
aminer responds with either approval of the patent application
or further rejections. 35 These rejections are often called "final
rejections," reflecting the fact that the applicant does not have
an absolute right to respond. 36 In practice, the applicant will
usually be given an opportunity to respond and make further
arguments or amendments. 37 This back-and-forth communica
tion between examiner and applicant can continue over months
or even years until either the applicant abandons the applica
tion or it is granted. 38 The average duration from application
to issuance or abandonment is approximately two to three
years, but the actual time spent by either the applicant, coun
sel, or examiner is nowhere near that lengthy.39 A conservative
estimate of the total average time spent in the active prosecu
tion of a patent is between fifty to one hundred hours of work
by the prosecuting attorney, and around twenty hours by the
See General Information, supra note 14.
See Performance and Accountability Report, supra note 15, at 15.
31 See id.
32 See General Information, supra note 14.
33 See id.
34 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kyogo Kabushiki, 535 U.S. 722,
727 (2002).
35 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.111 - 1.114 (2000); General Information, supra note 14.
36 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.113; General Information, supra note 14.
37 See General Information, supra note 14.
38 See id.
39 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1495, 1500 (2001) [hereinafter Lemley, Rational Ignorance].
29

30
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patent examiner.40
While many examiners are experienced and highly compe
tent, criticism of the patent application process is widespread. 41
Commentators argue that examiners have insufficient exper
tise to accurately determine if an application represents an ad
vance over the prior art.42 As noted, a patent examiner is re
quired only to have an undergraduate degree in a relevant
field,43 whereas many patent applications realistically require
more specialized knowledge. 44
A second criticism of the USPTO is that patents are inap
propriately issued, resulting in virtually any application's ac
ceptance provided the inventor is sufficiently persistent. 45 In
deed, the USPTO's mission is to grant patents. 46 A prime
criticism in recent years has been focused on "business meth
ods" patents, embodied by the Amazon.com patent on "one
click" shopping. 47 Some commentators criticize the conceptual
basis for patenting business methods, while others simply be
lieve that a substantial number of those patents are invalid
and should never have been granted. 48
Perhaps the strongest criticism targets jury verdicts in
validating patents. According to one study of infringement
cases decided in 2001, around fifty to sixty jury verdicts in
cluded the invalidation of a patent, or a finding that a patent
was unenforceable. 49 Similar studies have found that half of
patents litigated are found invalid by juries. 50 Presumably a
40 See id. at 1499-1500.
41 See, e.g., Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 39 (arguing that improv
ing the Patent Office examination process is not cost-effective, preferring a
more searching inquiry into patents' validity by the courts); see also James
Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44.
42 See, e.g., Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 39, at 1495-96 n.2 (noting
the USPTO's failure to "hire examiners skilled in the software arts or to allow
software engineers to practice before it, and failing to classify software prior
art well").
43 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
44 See Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 39, at 1495-96 n.2.
45 See id. at 1523-24.
46 See id.
47 U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411, http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph
Parser?Sect1=PT01&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=/netahtml/srchnum.h
tm&r=1&f=G&l=50&sl=5,960, 411.WKU.&OS=PN/5,960, 411&RS=PN15,960,4
11 (last visited February 13, 2004); see also generally Gleick, supra note 41.
48 See Gleick, supra note 41.
49See University of Houston Law Center, Decisions for 2001,
http://www.patstats.org/200l.html(lastvisitedAug.11. 2003).
50 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity
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significant number of infringement claims are never asserted,
or if asserted, relatively small settlements are reached. 51
Notwithstanding the criticism, some consider the United
States' patent system a key factor in U.S. innovation, outweigh
ing its possible deficiencies. 52 If successful, the applicant re
ceives a patent representing the government's conclusion that
the invention described in the application is both worthy of pro
tection and of a temporary monopoly. To put it in the context
of the Phelox hypothetical, based on a half-week of considera
tion by the examiner, MegaPharma will get a lengthy monopoly
on its product, and, as discussed infra,53 a presumption in any
subsequent litigation that the monopoly is appropriate.

B. FDA ApPROVAL
The process of putting a drug through the development and
approval process is a lengthy and expensive one. Recent stud
ies indicate that the average cost of developing a drug is
roughly $800 million. 54 Seventeen new drugs were approved by
the FDA in 2002, and the average period from application to
approval was 17.8 months. 55 To handle the INDs and NDAs it
receives each year, the FDA employs hundreds of reviewers in
various fields. 56 The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
("CDER") describes its job as "ensuring that drugs are safe and
of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 206-7 (1998).
51 The USPTO itself has concluded that, between 1999 and 2002, from 4.2% to
6.6% of issued patents have at least one claim that would be held invalid if
considered by a court. See Performance and Accountability Report, supra note
15, at 18.
52 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993-1000 (1997) (describing the commonly assumed
idea that the patent system encourages innovation); cf. Mark A. Lemley,
Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 137 (2000) (noting studies challenging the innovation story while giv
ing the notion due accord).
53 See infra section II.
54 See PhRMA, Most Drugs Never Recoup the Average Cost of Development,
http://www.phrma.org/publications/quickfactsI16.04.2003. 717.cfm (Mar. 26,
2003) [hereinafter PhRMA]. PhRMA is an industry advocacy group that may
be interested in emphasizing the high costs of drug development.
55
See
PhRMA,
New
Drug
Approvals
in
2002,
1,
http://www.phrma.org/newmedicines/resources/2003-01-30.102.pdf (last VIS
ited August 11, 2003) [hereinafter PhRMA, New Drug Approvals in 2002].
56 "[The1 CDER is the largest of the FDA's five centers, with a staff of about
1,800." Tamara Nordenberg, Inside FDA: The Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research,
FDA
CONSUMER
MAG.,
July-Aug.
1996,
http://www.fda.gov/fdaC/features/696cder.html(lastvisitedAug.11. 2003).
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effective." 57
Some sources list the average time from discovery through
approval as ten to fifteen years. 58 The process of discovery
through filing an IND could take an average of six to seven
years, followed by another six to seven years of clinical trials,
with a further eighteen months prior to approval by the FDA. 59
Given five thousand compounds that reach preclinical studies,
only five are tested in humans, and of those five, one eventually
obtains approval by the FDA.60
NDAs are themselves extraordinary documents. An NDA
typically runs over 100,000 pages. 61 It contains all data from
the sponsor's study of the drug in preclinical and clinical trials,
along with the sponsor's interpretation of these data. 62 It
represents the results of thousands of hours of work and mil
lions of dollars.63
The FDA review process includes reviewers from a number
of disciplines working in tandem. Statisticians, chemists,
pharmacologists, physicians, pharmacokineticists, and, when
appropriate, microbiologists, are all involved in reviewing the
data provided by the drug's sponsor. 64
The NDA process is essentially ex parte, although there
can be more public information available concerning the appli
cation status than can be found in the patent context. 65 Re
quests for additional testing, rejections, grants, and review
panels66 are all public activities, and an NDA filing is fre
quently announced by the sponsor in press releases. 67 While
the application process occasionally enters the public domain, it
57
58

59
60
61

62
63

64

See id.
See PhRMA, New Drug Approvals in 2002, supra note 55, at 17.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See FDA, Benefit vs. Risk: How CDER Approves New

Drugs,

http://www.fda.gov/cder/aboutiwhatwedo/testtube-5.pdf(lastvisitedAug.11.
2003) [hereinafter FDA, Benefits vs. Risk].
65 See, e.g., Press Release, AstraZeneca, AstraZeneca Submits its New Super

statin, CRESTORTM, for Regulatory Approval in the US and Europe. Devel
opment of VIOZAWM COPD Treatment to be Discontinued; Resources to be Re
Promising
Products
in
R&D
Pipeline,
allocated
to
More
http://www.astrazeneca.com/pressrelease/393.aspx (June 27, 2001); see also
Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 39, at 1499.
66 See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
67 See, e.g., Press Release, AstraZeneca, supra note 65.
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remains fundamentally non-adversaria1. 68 The data are re
viewed and reviewers provide recommendations as to whether
the product should be approved. 69 Based on these recommen
dations and further study of the underlying data, the FDA
chooses to approve the drug, reject the application, or request
additional information. 70
The review process, while subject to criticism 71 , is not gen
erally considered a rubber stamp. Recent high-profile rejec
tions 72 and demands for additional data 73 demonstrate that the
FDA will not approve all applications. The FDA also regularly
appoints a review panel, made up of neutral third-party physi
cians, scientists, and others to examine the data from a special
ist's point ofview. 74
This process is time and labor intensive. Recall that the
time from NDA submission to approval averages about twenty
months. 75 These twenty months are not spent waiting for re
sponses, but rather spent analyzing and reviewing the submit
ted NDA, and participating in discussions between the FDA
and the sponsor. 76 The time from the IND to the NDA averages
seven years, and the time from discovery to the IND averages
six and a half years. 77
See FDA, Benefits vs. Risk, supra note 64.
See id.
70 See id.
71 See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
72 The Imclone cancer drug Erbitux's rejection by the FDA in 2001 was subject
to great press interest. The Erbitux application was recently resubmitted to
the FDA.
See Matthew Herper, Puncturing the ImClone Hype,
http://www.forbes.com/technology/2003/06/0 2/cx_mh_0602imclone. html (June
6,2003).
73 Crestor, a member of the class of anti-cholesterol medications known as
statins, was ultimately approved with a lower dosage range than proposed by
its sponsor AstraZeneca. See FDA Advisory Committee Meeting Briefing
Document
NDA
21-366
for
the
use
of
CRESTOR,
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/briefing/3968B1_02_A-FDA
Clinical%20Review.pdf (June 11, 2003); FDA Talk Paper, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, FDA Approves New Drug for Lowering Cholesterol, T03-61,
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2003/ANS01247.html
(Aug.
12,
2003).
74 Indeed, the approval of Crestor occurred only after such a meeting. See
FDA Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 73.
75 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
76 See Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 39, at 1500.
77 See John T. Kelly, The Drug Development and Approval Process, New Drug
Approvals in 2002, 17, http://www.phrma.org/newmedicines/resources/2003
0l-30.102.pdf; see also PhRMA, New Drug Approvals in 2002, supra note 55,
at 17.
68

69
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An important part of the evaluation by the FDA is the de
termination of what information goes into a drug's package in
sert.78 FDA approval of a drug does not allow the manufac
turer to market it however it sees fit or for any use it wishes to
pitch. Instead, the approval carries with it an important
phrase: "adequate information has been presented to demon
strate that the drug product is safe and effective for use as rec
ommended in the agreed upon labeling text."79 Marketing out
side the label results in the drug being misbranded. 8o
However, with respect to use and marketing within the label,
the approval denotes that the drug is safe and effective.81
Unlike the patent process,82 the FDA involvement in a
drug does not end with its approval. 83 The FDA has a perpet
ual, extensive monitoring process and ongoing authority over
the drug sponsors to require additional information, testing, or
actions, from label changes up to and including involuntary
product withdrawal or recall. 84 Every time the drug company
wishes to change the package insert in order to add an indica
tion, a warning, or a dose, the FDA must decide once again
whether the product is indeed safe and effective by considering
the data from the clinical trials as well as information from
post-marketing reports. 85
Mter a drug company begins marketing a drug, it remains
responsible for reporting to the FDA any adverse events it
learns of on a specific schedule. 86 Reporting to either the FDA
78 See Letter from Center for Drug Evaluation and Research to Parke-Davis
Pharmaceutical
Research,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/appletterI1998/20702ltrs003s005.pdf
(Jul.
10,
1998) (FDA letter approving Lipitor).
79Id.
80 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (2000); Henley v. FDA, 77 F.3d 616, 621 (2d Cir.
1996).
81 See, e.g., Letter from David G. Orloff, Director, Division of Metabolic and
Endocrine Drug Products, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, to Chris
topher Graham, Director, Worldwide Regulatory Strategy, Pfizer, Inc.,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/appletter/2002/20702se5-033ltr.pdf (Oct. 18, 2002)
(2002 FDA letter approving a label change for Lipitor, including "safe and ef
fective" finding).
82 In very rare circumstances, the USPTO will reconsider previously issued
patents. See Performance and Accountability Report, supra note 15, at 106
(noting that in 2002, 272 requests for reexamination were received, of which
200 were granted).
83 See Nordenberg, supra note 56.
84 See id.
85 See id.
86 See id.
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or the drug company by healthcare providers or others is en
tirely voluntary.87 These adverse event reports are not consid
ered to be a reliable basis for determining causation or inci
dence rate. 88 However, they can be valuable in generating
hypotheses or signals of potential safety issues, and drug com
panies and the FDA monitor them closely.89 The FDA also oc
casionally performs audits of pharmaceutical companies' drug
safety departments, evaluating whether the processes are in
place for appropriate handling of the event reports and whether
those processes are followed correctly.90
Like the USPTO, critics argue that the FDA's review and
ongoing monitoring process is inadequate. 91 The approval
process is based almost entirely on self-reporting by the phar
maceutical companies. 92 These companies have an apparent
interest other than full disclosure. 93 The FDA does not perform
its own trials, and clinical trials are performed by physicians
who are paid by the pharmaceutical companies themselves. 94
Critics also charge that the FDA is more focused on reducing
approval times than on ensuring that approval is appropriate,
and further assert that the agency has been captured by the
companies it regulates. 95 Based on these and other criticisms,
these critics argue that the pharmaceutical companies can get
a defective drug approved by concealing unfavorable data, in
tentionally forgoing experiments to uncover data that would
See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Advanced Event Reporting
System, http://www.fda.gov/cder/aers/default.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004)

87

(describing the AERS voluntary reporting system) [hereinafter AERS Descrip
tion].
8821 C.F.R. § 314.80(k) (2003).
89 See AERS Description, supra note 87.
90 See, e.g., Presentation by Nancy Haggard, Post-Marketing Adverse Drug
Experience Manager, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.s. Food
and
Drug
Administration,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/presentldia
62000/haggard/haggard.ppt (Jun. 13, 2000).
91 See, e.g., Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of
Symmetry in Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147 (2000).
92 See, e.g., id. at 2154-55.
93 Pharmaceutical companies disagree, noting the long-term harm caused by
problems with products and the serious risks in litigation of hiding informa
tion from the FDA. See, e.g., PhRMA, Monitoring the Safety of Drugs,
http://srpub.phrma.org/papersI12.16.98.drug.safety.html(lastvisitedAug.11,
2003).
94 See, e.g., Lexchin et al., Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research
Outcome and Quality: Systematic Review, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 1167, 1170 (2003)
(concluding that the sponsors of studies do affect the outcomes).
95 See, e.g., Noah, supra note 91, at 2154 (rejecting arguments that the FDA
has been captured by the industries it regulates).
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render the drug not approvable, and using connections or lob
bying power to ensure approval. 96 Even with the number of
employees at the FDA involved in evaluating a new drug, the
sheer volume of material submitted makes them, according to
critics, incapable of doing a genuinely in-depth analysis. 97
Similar charges are leveled at the ongoing monitoring of
pharmaceuticals and adverse events. The section of employees
tracking the relevant data is sometimes characterized as un
der-funded and under-qualified. 98 As with the approval proc
ess, critics note that adverse event data comes largely from the
companies being regulated, and thus critics suggest that these
data can be affected improperly by these companies. 99
Juries provide some implicit criticism as well. Huge dam
age rewards in pharmaceutical tort litigation indicate that at
least some juries have concluded that certain FDA-approved
products are not safe and effective. lOG Still, it is unlikely that
even the most ardent critic of the FDA would contend that the
FDA's approvals are wrong one in twenty times, while the
USPTO itself identifies that proportion as the goal for errors in
patent grants. 101 As in the patent context, most observers tend
to agree that the U.S. system of drug approval is among the
best in the world. 102 The FDA gets life-saving or life-improving
drugs onto the market in a reasonable time frame while pre
venting most drugs with a negative risk-benefit ratio from
reaching the market. 103
See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO L. J.
2049, 2076 (2000) (rejecting a regulatory compliance defense, citing flaws in
the regulatory system).
97 See, e.g., Arnst et al., New Drugs: Why So Many Delays?, BUSINESSWEEK,
Mar. 11, 2002, at 62-63 (citing varied approval standards and accelerated ap
proval of new drugs based on overeager pharmaceutical companies and an un
der-funded FDA).
96

See, e.g., The Food and Drug Law Institute's 45th Annual Educational Con
ference Keynote Addresses, 57 FOOD DRUG L. J. 227, 229-30 (2002).
99 See, e.g., Noah, supra note 91, at 2154.
100 See, e.g., AHP Settles Recent Verdict, 5 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REPORT: FEN
98

PHEN/REDUX Iss. 1, 4 (Nov. 2001) (reporting a $9 million settlement in a case

in which the jury had awarded $56.5 million).
101 See Performance and Accountability Report, supra note 15, at 13.
102 See, e.g., Symposium, Economic Models of the Emerging Biotechnology In
dustry, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1525, 1546 (1993).
103 One might question whether approving another in a long series of SSRIs
(as in the hypothetical) is a useful activity for the FDA. Without going into
detail, there is broad agreement that having more safe and effective drugs in a
particular class is valuable, due generally to individuals' idiosyncratic re
sponses to medications and to the effects of competition on drug pricing. See
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C. PATENT ISSUANCE AND FDA ApPROVAL COMPARED
In certain ways, the patent application and drug approval
processes are similar. Each can take a number of months, each
involves evaluation by people who are at least theoretically
trained for the job they perform, and each results in a license
from the government for certain conduct. On the other hand,
the extent of the review is quite different. The patent applica
tion process generally represents a couple hundred of hours of
work, including an average of only twenty hours by the exam
iner. In contrast, the NDA process, if it reaches completion,
represents thousands or tens of thousands of hours of work and
testing on thousands of patients. 104 The USPTO review gener
ally is performed by one person, or two if a supervisor is in
volved. 105 The FDA review involves a significantly larger num
ber of people from an array of specialties. Significantly, the
FDA involvement continues throughout the marketing of a
drug as well, so that the approval is not a one-time event. 106 It
is certainly fair to say that the NDA process is a much "bigger"
process than the patent process.
Part II of this article compares the respective systems in
more detail. For now, it is enough to conclude that the FDA re
view is at least as exhaustive as the USPTO's. With that in
mind, this article next analyzes how the USPTO and FDA re
views play out in litigation.
II. THE EFFECTS OF PATENT ISSUANCE OR FDA
APPROVAL ON LITIGATION

A. PATENT ISSUANCE-PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY
Despite the criticisms of the patent process outlined above,
patents are protected by a statutory presumption of validity.107
In recognition that the USPTO, as an agency, is considered the
expert on patentability; juries are not permitted to find that a
patent is invalid merely by a preponderance of the evidence.
Instead, the finding must be by clear and convincing evi-

In re Rezulin Prod. Liab. Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 136, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (not
ing that individual patients are affected differently by the same medication).
104 See supra Part I.E.
105 See supra Part LA.
106 See supra Part I.E.
107 35 U.S.C. § 282.
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dence. lOS Further, juries are usually specifically instructed by
the judge that a patent is to be presumed valid. 109
Information about the value of the patent office's review
comes not only from the patent-holder's attorney, but also from
the judge. The psychological impact of this presumption of va
lidity is difficult to measure. However, it is not insignificant
that a jury is instructed by the one nominally neutral person in
the courtroom that it must begin deliberations with the belief
that the patent is valid. llo
These presumptions are codified in the Patent Act of
1952.111 Congress, implementing the Constitution's mandate,
had set up an agency specifically tasked to evaluate patent ap
plications and give inventors a lengthy monopoly on their in
ventions. Because that agency was the specialist in determin
ing the patentability of a particular invention, the presumption
of validity was created, first judicially and then later codified
by Congress. 112
While it is difficult to evaluate the effect of the presump
tion of validity numerically, there is little doubt in the patent
litigation bar that it is significant. Litigants emphasize it in
openings, in closings, and everywhere else possible. Jury re
search indicates that it makes a difference. ll3 The only person
108Id.
At a minimum, the jury is told that the burden of proof on invalidity must
be met by clear and convincing evidence. See Model Patent Jury Instructions
for the N.D.Cal., n.1 (Jan. 18, 2002). There is some debate on whether the in
structions should expressly include a statement that the USPTO's determina
tion is to be presumed correct. See id. Regardless of whether that statement is
included, every jury is told that invalidity must be found by a high evidentiary
standard such as clear and convincing evidence. See id. (discussing how the
burden demonstrates the clear and convincing standard); see also id. at 22 (in
dicating that the jury should find a patent invalid only if highly probable).
110 This instruction is likely better respected than the presumption of inno
cence. Most jurors presumably have relatively little experience with the pat
ent system, and thus have no reason to believe it grants patents without a
good basis. Yet, ample data suggests that jurors believe the fact that someone
is charged with a crime suggests that the person likely did something wrong,
notwithstanding constitutional presumptions. See The View from the Jury
109

Box: Many Jurors Consider Deep Pockets and Ignore Presumption of Inno
cence, 15 NAT'L L.J. S12 (1993).
H.R. REP. No. 1923, at 2523 (1952).
35 US.C § 282; see generally Editorial Notes, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 575
(1953).
113 See Nicholas M. Cannella & Timothy J. Kelly, Jury Trials and Mock Jury
Trials, 1 PAT. LITIG. 731, 739 (1993) (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks,
and Literary Property Handbook Series No. G-375) (summarizing jury re
search indicating a belief in extensive USPTO review and deference to that
111
112
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in the courtroom who the jury might see as having no agenda is
the judge, and he or she is telling the jury to presume that the
patent is valid. 114 Like the patent process itself, the presump
tions given patent holders are the subject of extensive criti
cism. 115 Once that criticism is examined more carefully, how
ever, it generally becomes clear that concerns about the patent
office rather than the presumption of validity is the basis for
the criticism. 116 With some notable exceptions,117 most critics
are not calling for an end to the presumption of validity and its
accompanying procedural advantages, and no critics seem to
argue that the presumption has no effect. Rather, the critics
argue that the patenting process should be improved.

review).
114 See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical
Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 408-09 (2000) (concluding

that juries find for the patent-holder more often than judges).
115 See Jay Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 763-64 (2002); Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra
note 39; FTC, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and

Patent

Law

and

Policy,

8

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/1OIinnovationrptsummary.pdf (last visited Decem
ber 15, 2003).
116 Kesan, supra note 115, at 765-66.
117 Jay Kesan has proposed the following as one strategy to deal with the pre
sumed problems in the USPTO: the elimination of the presumption of validity
if the patentee does not disclose more than the current minimal prior art, and
in which the presumption of validity only exists with respect to disclosed prior
art. See Kesan, supra note 115. Mark Lemley argues that limiting the pre
sumption of validity to prior art references and arguments actually considered
by the examiner would have the adverse effect of flooding the examiner with
prior art. Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 39, at 1528-1529. His ulti
mate proposal, based on a conclusion that a very small proportion of issued
patents are actually asserted or litigated, is that the presumption of validity
should exist, but only require proof by a preponderance ofthe evidence to over
come. Id. In other words, we should accept the fact that we have a good, but
not great, patent office, and treat its conclusions accordingly. Lemley, Ra
tional Ignorance, supra note 39, at 1528-1529.
Recently the Federal Trade Commission urged the abandonment of the pre
sumption of validity standard for many of the reasons cited in this article. See
FTC, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent
Law and Policy, supra note 115, at 8-20 (proposing a reduction in the burden
of proof to a preponderance of the evidence).
This article operates from the assumption that the presumption of validity
makes some sense in the patent context, but the idea of eliminating the pre
sumption entirely because the examination is so minimal adds support to my
view that the FDA review is relatively superior to the USPTO review. With
out giving the subject full review, resources would generally be better allo
cated if the presumption of validity were modified or removed rather than
spending more money on the USPTO.
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B. FDA ApPROVAL-No PRESUMPTION OF SAFETY
In typical pharmaceutical litigation, a substantial portion
of the plaintiffs' effort is directed at undermining the FDA's de
termination of safety and efficacy. In most mass tort litigation,
defendants are accused of failing to disclose required informa 
tion to the FDA, specifically data from clinical trials, adverse
event reports, preclinical data, or any other material informa
tion. 118 On the other hand, to build on any evidence of non
compliance, plaintiffs spend considerable resources on efforts to
diminish the resources or skills of the FDA. For example,
through an "FDA expert," juries will hear about the FDA being
overwhelmed with data, understaffed, or simply filled with in
competent bureaucrats. 119
This road goes both ways. Defendants get all the mileage
they can from FDA approval, regardless of the actual exten
siveness of the review and monitoring involved. If the facts
support it, defendants emphasize the complete and voluminous
information provided to the FDA. They may even bring an en
tire NDA, possibly hundreds of boxes, into the courtroom. They
establish the absence of FDA sanction for any regulatory viola
tions, and discuss at length the approval and ongoing monitor
ing process discussed above. 120 If they have "clean" reports
from FDA audits or inspections, those reports will surely be
blown up on large demonstrative exhibits.
From the defense's perspective, juries will hear about the
FDA as a model government agency second to none. Its em
ployees are impeccably thorough, highly trained, unrivaled in
118 For example, the public interest group Public Citizen requested that
criminal charges be brought against Abbott Laboratories for allegedly failing
to comply with reporting requirements regarding eight deaths and other ad
verse events among patients taking the diet drug Meridia. Sidney M. Wolfe,

Letter

to

Dept.

of

Health

and

Human

Services,

http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7175. These allegations
almost immediately made their way into plaintiffs' attorneys' advertising for
clients. See, e.g., Belluck & Fox, LLP, All About Meridia's Dangers, at
http://www.meridiarecall.com/news.htm. These allegations can be analogized
to claims of inequitable conduct in patent applications where patentees are
alleged to have withheld material prior art or other information from the Pat
ent Office. Michael Green has suggested that having a compliance defense
based on compliance with regulatory requirements would shift the focus of
litigation to proving noncompliance rather than reducing the litigation overall.
See Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining
the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461,507-09 (1997).
119 See, e.g., Medrano v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., No. B-150-760-B (Tex. Dist.
Ct. Apr. 9, 1999) (cited in 2 No.9 Andrews Diet Drugs Litig. Rep. 14).
120 See supra Part I.E.
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their dedication to patient safety, and never hesitant to act
when needed, despite any commercial consequences. The ap
proval process is the model for the world and is nearly perfect,
as the argument goes.
The current tort system is the subject of extensive criti
cism, largely from those who believe it exposes defendants to
too much liability based on bad science. This criticism ranges
from editorials in the popular press warning of dire conse
quences 121 to the academic press. 122 The first line of criticisms
generally focuses on prominent verdicts based on purportedly
unfounded expert testimony that ultimately convinces a jury
that causation exists where the weight of scientific evidence
says it does not. Often, the critics argue that the threat of
large and unjustifiable verdicts against pharmaceutical com
panies risks dampening the quest for new drugs to treat seri
ous diseases or conditions.
Certain states have implemented an "FDA defense" that
allows pharmaceutical defendants to receive either presump
tions in their favor or general immunity from punitive damages
with certain exceptions. 123 Texas's implementation of the "FDA
defense", which is the closest to this article's proposal, has only
been in effect for a few months. 124 The application and results
of the defense should be interesting, given the enormous
amount of litigation surrounding the pharmaceutical industry
centered in Texas.
If Texas's statute withstands the inevitable constitutional
challenges, FDA-approved drugs will receive, in the context of
failure-to-warn cases, a rebuttable presumption that the label
ing is appropriate. The presumption can be overcome by show
ing that the defendant (a) made material misrepresentations to
the FDA, (b) continued to sell the drug after being ordered to
withdraw it by the FDA, (c) recommended off-label use, or (d)

121 See, e.g., Shad Rowe, Texas Tort Reform Can Be a Model for Other States,
HOUSTON
Bus.
J.
(July
11,
2003),
http://www.bizjoumals.com/houston/stories/2003/07 /14/editoria14.html.
122 See, e.g., Michael D. Green, Safety as an Element of Pharmaceutical Qual
ity: The Respective Roles of Regulation and Tort Law, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 163,
165 (1998).
123 See MICH. COMPo LAWS § 600.2946(5) (precluding suit if the drug in ques
tion is FDA approved and the manufacturer complied with relevant regula
tions); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 82.007& 82.008(a) (2004).
124 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 82.007 & 82.008(a) (2004); see Rowe, su
pra note 124.
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prescribed an off-label use. 125
III. AN ANALYSIS OF DEFERENCE
One reaction to the situations described above is the con
clusion that all agency decisions should be treated the same in
litigation. After all, each agency, whether it is the FDA, the
USPTO, or some other agency, is presumably an expert in its
field and should be accorded some deference as a result. Nev
ertheless, the level of review and the interests being protected
vary dramatically among various agencies. 126 Furthermore, in
litigation implicating agency determinations, the interests of
the courts will vary dramatically. This part of the article ad
dresses some of those interests, and suggests what factors
should be considered when considering the agencies in ques
tion.

A.

GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS IN EACH AGENCY

Through its myriad agencies, the federal government
makes thousands of decisions daily, from approvals of political
marches in national parks to the issuance of patents. Most of
those decisions could ultimately end up being challenged in
court, whether by parties arguing that the criteria applied were
unconstitutional, or by parties disputing the factual basis of the
decisions. As outlined above, how these decisions are consid
ered in litigation varies rather dramatically, at least in the two
example situations. The purpose of the agencies' determina
tions is thus a first question in deciding whether the present
treatment of patent approvals and FDA approvals is appropri
ate.
1. The USPTO

The USPTO was established by Congress "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re
spective Writings and Discoveries."127 The primary role of the
USPTO is to issue patents, but some commentators argue that

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.008(b) (2004).
As described below, the agencies' treatments are arguably reversed: the
more thorough agency gets less deference. Yet, the elements explored en route
to that conclusion do indicate that different treatment can be appropriate.
127 U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8.
125
126
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it takes that goal too far by issuing too many of them. 128 An
initial question, then, is whether we want the government to
issue patents at all. A robust patent system is often considered
critical to maintaining a steady stream of innovations resulting
in economic stimulus and technological advancement. 129 To put
it in the hypothetical's context, if MegaPharma genuinely did
invent the SSRI in question but the patent system did not ex
ist, a generic drug company would, as a result of avoiding the
research and development costs incurred by MegaPharma, rap
idly release a generic version of Phelox and charge less for it.
Therefore, MegaPharma would lose its incentive to innovate.
On the other hand, the desire to provide incentives to in
novate is not the same as a desire to issue undeserved patents.
An incorrectly issued patent causes significant harm as well,
since companies that would otherwise consider entering the
market might stay out as a result. Furthermore, if another
company thought the patent was invalid, the financial hurdle
created by having to litigate the patent's validity is sizable and,
especially considering the presumption of validity, carries a
large element of risk. 130
It is important to note that an incorrectly issued patent
will not have an adverse effect on the public at large, except in
sofar as it will have the potential to slow innovation. In most
cases, it is not likely to put citizens' health or lives in danger.l3l
Moreover, a very small proportion of patents are actually liti
gated. Most sit in a binder, and a surprising number are aban
doned. 132
128
129

See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
But see Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, supra

note 52 (suggesting that in the age of venture capital, the incentive of innova
tion is no longer as significant a factor in innovation as it once was).
130 Attorneys' fees are available only in "exceptional" cases. 35 U.S.C. § 285.
Again, there have been proposals for increasing the availability of fees in the
context of patents that are found to be invalid. See Kesan, supra note 115.
131 In the pharmaceutical context, notable exceptions exist. The most public
ity in recent years has focused on patent protection for drugs that treat life
threatening diseases. As of this writing, the World Trade Organization is on
the verge of approving a pact to permit the elimination of patent protection on
certain AIDS drugs for low-cost distribution in developing countries. See WTO

Votes To Bypass Patents on Medicines Cheap Generics Go To Poor Nations,
WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2003, at A16. Less health-oriented but still important
is the fact that an improperly granted patent may result in the public paying
monopoly prices when it should not have to do so. Notwithstanding these im
portant exceptions, this article maintains that most patent grants or denials
have minimal impact on the public, whether the decisions are right or wrong.
132 Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 39.
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When presented with a close call on whether or not to issue
a patent, one might appropriately conclude that the USPTO
should grant the patent. Granting patents is, after all, its mis
sion; and the negatives of getting it wrong, while not negligible,
are not devastating. 133 In short, the government's interest in
the USPTO includes granting patents, as well as making cor
rect decisions on patentability most of the time. The USPTO's
mistakes get fixed by the courts and, for the most part, cause
compensable financial harm without enormous public prob
lems.
2. FDA

The FDA is, at its foundation, a public health agency. Its
mission is to:
(1) promote the public health by promptly and efficiently
reviewing clinical research and taking appropriate action on
the marketing of regulated products in a timely manner;
(2) with respect to such products, protect the public health
by ensuring that 
(A) foods are safe, wholesome, sanitary, and properly la
beled;
(B) human and veterinary drugs are safe and effective;
(C) there is reasonable assurance of the safety and effec
tiveness of devices intended for human use;
(D) cosmetics are safe and properly labeled; and
(E) public health and safety are protected from electronic
product radiation;
(3) participate through appropriate processes with repre
sentatives of other countries to reduce the burden of regulation,
harmonize regulatory requirements, and achieve appropriate
reciprocal arrangements; and
(4) as determined to be appropriate by the Secretary, carry
out paragraphs (1) through (3) in consultation with experts in
science, medicine, and public health, and in cooperation with
consumers, users, manufacturers, importers, packers, distribu
tors, and retailers of regulated products. 134
The FDA does not exist to stimulate the economy, or to en
133 Recall the earlier discussion of the quality goals of the USPTO. See supra
Part LA. Mark Lemley notes that the Patent Office has had (at least at one
point) a large poster by its entrance stating that its goal was to "helpD our
customers get patents." Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 39, at n.3.
134 FDA Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 § 406.
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sure the rapid delivery of drugs to consumers. It exists to
"promote" and "protect" the public health and, in the pharma
ceutical context, to ensure that drugs are "safe and effective."135
The approval of a drug that is either unsafe or ineffective has
the potential to cause serious injury or death. On a more mun
dane but still important note, it may also result in public and
private funds being spent on drugs that are less safe or less ef
fective than believed by consumers.
The fact that the role of the FDA does not include stimulat
ing the economy does not mean that its decisions have no eco
nomic impact. Pfizer, the largest research-based pharmaceuti
cal company, now has the third largest market capitalization in
the world,136 and health care expenses continue to consume a
large portion of the United States gross domestic product.137
New drugs can help productivity, reduce (or increase) health
care costs, and extend the productive (or nonproductive) life of
residents. Nonetheless, the purpose of the FDA is, at least
nominally, to protect and promote the public health independ
ent of the economic impact of its decisions. 13s
Another factor relevant to the interests in play relates to
the use of the licenses. As noted earlier, a very small percent
age of issued patents ever get "used." In contrast, virtually all
approved drugs are marketed. While a mistake in the patent
context is very likely never to get noticed, a mistake in approv
ing a drug almost certainly will.
If the core motivation of the FDA is indeed public health,
then a close call with respect to safety should be made on the
side of caution, and every question relating to safety should be
examined with great care. Mistakes will happen, but they
should rarely be tolerated. Review of mistakes should be exam
ined more carefully than in other contexts. Though damage
135Id.
136

Pfizer.com., Pfizer and Pharmacia Combine Operations, Create World's

Largest

Research-Based

Pharmaceutical

Company,

http://www.pfizer.com/are/in vestorsJeleasesl
mn_2003_0416.cfm (Apr. 16, 2003).
137 Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Program Information: On Medi
care, Medicaid, SCRIP & Other Programs of the Centers for Medicare & Medi
caid Services, 3, http://cms.hhs.gov/charts/series/secl.pdf (Jun. 2002). The
most current statistics indicate that health care costs have generally stabi
lized at around 13% ofthe gross domestic product. See id.
138 The most recent public example of an FDA decision affecting a company's
fortunes is likely the rejection of ImClone's cancer drug Erbitux. See Nancy
Dillon, Cancer Drug Woes Add to Imclone Ills, DAILY NEWS, Aug. 20, 2002, at
59.
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awards received in litigation can help to alleviate the impact of
a mistake, few would argue that money can restore the damage
caused by a defective drug.
Therefore, the government's interest in the drug approval
process is protecting the public by approving only safe and ef
fective ones. If an error is to occur, it should occur on the side
of caution. In other words, if the FDA believed that Phelox
might cause tremor so as to make the drug's risk-benefit ratio
negative, it should have rejected MegaPharma's NDA.
B. JUDICIAL INTERESTS IN AGENCY DECISIONS

Regardless of the extent of an agency's efforts, mistakes
are bound to occur. Invariably, these mistakes will result in
litigation that questions the correctness of an agency's deci
sions. This article now addresses what interests are repre
sented in such litigation.
1. Patent Litigation

The most direct impact of patent litigation is on the liti
gants themselves. In general, one litigant holds a patent and
seeks to exclude others from performing infringing acts (e.g.,
making a product that infringes), while the other litigant con
tends either that it does not infringe or, relevant to this analy
sis, that the patent is invalid. The impact on each party is gen
erally financial and can range from a minor inconvenience to a
bet-the-company proposition.
The impact is not limited to the litigants, however. In the
hypothetical outlined at the start of this article, for example,
the availability of a generic version of Phelox would provide a
cheaper SSRI to patients or their Health Maintenance Organi
zations. One need only look at the explosion in pharmaceutical
treatment options for depression to see that the introduction of
new treatments can have significant societal impact. 139
Except for rare circumstances, however, most patent litiga
tion, while not entirely separated from daily life, has a limited
scope of effect. As a result, the courts' interests are similarly
limited. The courts wish to determine whether the patent was
properly granted given the state of knowledge at the time. If it
139 The first major SSRI, Prozac, has been taken by over 40 million people
worldwide, according to its name-brand manufacturer. See Prozac.com, How
Prozac Can Help: Prozac Makes History, http://www.prozac.comlindex.jsp (last
visited March 27, 2004.).
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was properly granted and thus infringed, one party will owe
the other party money, and an injunction will likely issue. If
the patent is found invalid, the accused infringer can continue
their actions, and attorneys' fees may be granted to the party
proving invalidity. In either case, the result is fundamentally
economic. 140 Most inventors believe patents are beneficial, even
if that patent might later be held invalid. Unless the patent is
obtained fraudulently, the danger of having to pay more than
attorneys' fees is minor, and even a questionable patent is more
beneficial in negotiations than no patent at all. In other words,
patent litigation plays a relatively minor role in regulating
conduct within the bounds of non-fraudulent behavior before
the patent office. Therefore, an inventor is unlikely to not ap
ply for a patent because of a fear that it might later be found
invalid.
2. Pharmaceutical Tort Litigation

Parties in pharmaceutical tort litigation argue over
whether or not the FDA correctly approved a drug. The impact
of FDA mistakes may be broader and more emotionally signifi
cant. In the case of FDA approval of a drug, a mistake 141 has
the potential to affect a great number of consumers. SSRIs, for
example, are prescribed to tens of millions of people worldwide
every year.142 This article's hypothetical five percent market
share for Phelox would reflect an enormous patient population
since litigation over the drug's safety would potentially have an
impact on all of them. 143
Similar to patent litigation, in pharmaceutical tort litiga
tion, a liable defendant pays damages to the plaintiff. There
are, however, two important differences between the two types
of litigation. First, litigation over pharmaceutical drugs elicits
emotion because it involves human life and health. Second,
there is a significant industry effect beyond the scope of the in
dividual litigation. Purely compensatory damages paid by a
This is an oversimplification, but provides a generally accurate overview.
Here the mistake refers to approving a pharmaceutical drug that later
proves to be unsafe for consumption.
140
141

142 See FTC Order Clears Way for $90 Billion Merger of Pfizer Inc. and War
ner-Lambert Company, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/06/pfizer.htm

(2000) (U.S. sales of SSRIISNRI [selective norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors]
antidepressants total approximately $7 billion annually).
143 Five percent of the seven billion dollar market in 2000 is 350 million dol
lars, which means the total number of customers could easily reach tens of
millions. See id.
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drug manufacturer can rapidly reach to millions of dollars or
more if punitive damages are awarded and upheld. 144 Defense
costs can easily reach to billions of dollars.145 It is possible that
blockbuster drugs could remain profitable even after massive
products liability litigation. However, unlike a patentee's deci
sion with respect to a potentially invalid patent, many drug
manufacturers would rather make no drug than an improperly
approved drug due to these costS. 146
Thus, the issues involved in determining whether the FDA
made a mistake in approving an unsafe drug are somewhat dif
ferent than those underlying a USPTO error in issuing a pat
ent. The potential group impacted by the FDA decision is lar
ger, and the impact is more personal. Furthermore, the
litigation has a larger potential impact on regulation of indus
try.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE "REGULATORY
COMPLIANCE DEFENSE"
This article's hypothetical situation deals with two ques
tions. The first question asks whether or not the USPTO
should have issued a patent for Phelox. The second question
asks whether or not it was a mistake for the FDA to approve
Phelox. Currently, a presumption of validity would likely up
hold the issuance of the patent by the USPTO. In the absence
of a presumption of safety, however, a jury is likely to find that
Phelox was unsafe because its risk-benefit ratio is negative.
This article argues that a company that has complied with all
relevant FDA regulatory requirements should receive some
144See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (re
stricting the availability and size of punitive damage awards under the due
process clause). "[P]unitive damages should only be awarded if the

defendant's culpability, after having paid compensatory damages,
is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanc
tions to achieve punishment or deterrence." Id. at 1251.
145 Up to 90,000 Opt Out of AHP Settlement; 61,000 File Claims, 6 MEALEY'S

LITIG. REP. FEN-PHEN IREDUX 2, 1-2 (2003) (noting that one manufacturer in
volved in the diet drug litigation has set aside $14 billion as its reserve for the
litigation).
146 This is at least suggested by the ratio of drugs that make it through the
development process. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. Of course,
certain blockbuster drugs (generally thought of as drugs with annual sales of
over a billion dollars) might remain profitable even after massive products li
ability litigation. In the current environment, this article contends that a
profit on any drug with a significant safety problem is unlikely at best. See
supra note 54.
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protection from tort suits like the protection enjoyed by patent
ees.
Academic discussions of a "regulatory" defense in the tort
context have been binary: either FDA compliance should pro
vide immunity with few exceptions 147 or the system should re
main largely unchanged with some incremental modifications
as to how cases are handled. 148 The discussions also tend to
consider regulatory compliance defenses either in a single lim
ited agency context (frequently the FDA), or all together, ad
dressing a wide range of regulatory activities. As outlined
throughout this article, the settings of different regulatory pro
ceedings should be considered, and each regulatory context
should be considered separately. When this approach is fol
lowed in connection with FDA-approved drugs, a third resolu
tion becomes a distinct possibility.
This third resolution is presented after discussion of the
two main approaches to a "regulatory defense" in the FDA con
text, demonstrated by recent articles by Professors Robert
Rabin and Richard Stewart. 149 This part examines what les
sons can be learned from comparing the FDA context to the
USPTO context, and it concludes that the comparison suggests
a different treatment for FDA approvals. This different treat
ment is comparable to the treatment of issued patents with re
spect to their validity.

A.

THE POSITION AGAINST PRECLUSION

In the keynote paper of the Georgetown Law Journal sym
posium, Professor Rabin concluded that the case for a regula
tory compliance defense 150 was "an uneasy proposition."151 In
regard to litigant competency, Rabin wrote that the tort system
maintained a role as an "information-generating mechanism
147 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort Li
ability: Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167 (2000) (summariz
ing the continued soundness of the 1991 American Law Institute Reporter's
Study, Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury).
148 See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Keynote Paper: Reassessing Regulatory Compli
ance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000) (discussing the proper role of regulatory com
pliance as a way to limit traditional functions ofthe tort system).
149 See supra notes 147-48. These articles do not encapsulate the entire range
of arguments existing, but are a convenient summary of the most relevant ar
guments.
150 The preclusion of a tort suit based on regulatory compliance. Rabin, supra
note 148.
151 Id. at 2053. Professor Rabin focuses largely on the American Law Insti
tute's 1991 proposal, discussed infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
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and as a compensatory system."152 As for system competency,
Professor Rabin first acknowledged that the tort system, in its
recent history, has been imperfect in reaching scientifically jus
tifiable conclusions, citing the Bendectin l53 and breast implant
litigation. 154 Nonetheless, he noted that the judicial system
has made some progress towards ameliorating these problems,
generally through strengthening the judicial role as a gate
keeper for expert testimony under Daubert 155 and Kumho
Tire.1 56 The judicial system has also made improvements
through innovative judicial efforts to obtain unbiased expert
opinions, such as Judge Pointer's expert panel in the breast
implant multidistrict litigation. 157
In addition to the modest improvements in gate-keeping
regarding expert testimonyl58, Rabin also considered the im
portance of the tort system as a means to uncover "bad con
duct" - cover-ups, a failure to disclose data to the FDA, inap
propriate marketing, and the like. With the FDA relationship
fundamentally nonadversarial, there presently exists no agency
or group of people besides plaintiffs' lawyers with an interest in
uncovering such wrongdoing. 159 While most proposals for a
broad regulatory compliance defense maintain an exception for
fraud, Rabin argued that the exception was too narrow. 160 He
noted that, for example, alleged fraudulent behavior by tobacco
companies was not uncovered by people seeking to prove fraud,
but by people seeking to prove negligence in failure to warn. If
a broad defense containing a fraud exception were in place, the
investigations that uncover fraud would potentially never oc
cur.161
Rabin, supra note 148, at 2061.
Id. at 2063; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993) (plaintiffs suing defendant pharmaceutical company to recover for birth
defects allegedly sustained as result of mother's ingestion of anti-nausea drug
Bendectin).
154 See Rabin, supra note 148, at 2061-63.
155 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (identifYing a judicial "gatekeeper" role in evalu
ating the validity and reliability of scientific evidence).
156 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-151 (1999) (clarifying
that Daubert applies to all expert testimony, not just that denominated "scien
tific," and also declaring the factors for evaluating proffered opinion testimony
identified in Daubert as nonexclusive).
157 See Rabin, supra note 148, at 2064-68.
158 See id. at 2067-68.
159Id. at 2069.
160 See id. at 2070.
152

153

161

See id.
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The second justification for the tort system, according to
Rabin, is its role in the enforcement of compensation. 162 He
first observed that many of the debates regarding a regulatory
defense assume that the standard applied will always be the
risk-benefit analysis. 163 However, if a version of California's
consumer-expectations theory, which makes the tort system
closer to a risk spreading system, is applied, a regulatory de
fense fits less well,164 As Rabin observed, a state could ration
ally decide to make its tort system a means for spreading the
risk of harm from pharmaceuticals, even when the drugs are
"safe" under a risk-benefit analysis. 165 Using the tort system as
this sort of no-fault insurance scheme is not its best use, as
Rabin noted. 166 However, it is another factor that points in fa
vor of keeping a role for the tort system.
Lastly, Professor Rabin discussed the implementation of
the broad regulatory compliance defense, and contended that it
faces numerous real-world problems. 167 Among them is the
possibility that the FDA is not "optimally stringent" or absent
of political pressure, as well as the danger that the fraud excep
tion would swallow the rule. 16S Finally, and most importantly,
Rabin looked at all potential situations that would take place
outside of the FDA's careful approval process. Even assuming
that the FDA's pre-marketing analysis is optimally stringent,
the roles that off-label usage, side effects not appearing in the
clinical trials, or over-promotions play must be determined. 169
Alleged injuries resulting from these contexts are common
place.17° Therefore, basing a broad defense in those post
marketing cases on the pre-marketing review suggests that a
regulatory compliance defense may not prove to be successful.
B. THE POSITION FOR PRECLUSION

The foundational document for most arguments in favor of
preclusion is the American Law Institute's 1991 Reporter's

162
163
164
165
166

167
168
169
170

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

at 2071-74.
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at
at
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2072-73.
2072-73.
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2082.
2076-77.
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Study.l7l The study recommended that "subject to certain care
fully tailored conditions and limitations, compliance with regu
latory requirements imposed by an administrative agency
should preclude tort liability based on negligence."l72 The for
mer Chief Reporter of the report, Professor Richard Stewart,
contributed his defense of the proposal to the symposium refer
enced above. 173
The ALI's (and Stewart's) proposal provides immunity if (a)
the risk was under the control of a "specialized administrative
agency" with "statutory authority to monitor and assess risk
creating activities", and with a "mandate to establish" controls
on relevant behavior; (b) the defendant complied with all rele
vant regulatory requirements; and (c) the defendant disclosed
to the agency all material information it has about the risks
and their control, including any indication that the agency's
approach might be inadequate. 174 "Tort litigation, in practical
effect, amounts to a second, duplicative system of review of the
agency's decision, conducted in accordance with quite different
procedures and principles."175 In other words, the FDA makes
an informed decision with extensive data available, yet juries
frequently disregard these data and make decisions that are
unsupported by science.
Professor Stewart notes the improvements in the gate
keeping efforts described by Professor Rabin and agrees that
they are good ideas. 176 He concludes, however, that the institu
tional improvements that have begun in the judicial system are
stronger evidence that the tort system's role should be aban
doned. 177 He suggests that those improvements are efforts to
make the tort system more like the FDA, with more expert in
volvement and more decisions made by analytical individuals
rather than juries. 178 Therefore, he concludes that if the way to
171
AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE,
REPORTER'S
STUDY,
ENTERPRISE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY (1991). This Study is not limited to
pharmaceuticals.
172 Stewart, supra note 147, at 2167.
173 See id. at 2167 n.1.
174 See id. at 2168. While the ALI proposal would limit the defense in all
situations where imposing tort liability, in addition to regulation, is likely
counterproductive, the exchange between Rabin and Stewart is focused on the
FDA-pharmaceutical context. See supra notes 147-48.
175 Stewart, supra note 147, at 2178.
176 See id. at 2177.
177 See id. at 2179.
178

See id.
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fix the tort system is to make it like the FDA, the tort system is
not needed. 179 "Why reinvent the wheel?"lS0
He then turns to Professor Rabin's contention that the tort
system maintains an important role in information gathering
and in compensation schemes. Professor Stewart again con
cludes that these roles fall short of justifying the current sys
tem. 1S1 As for information gathering, the "ferreting out in
stances of firms' nondisclosure,"ls2 Professor Stewart first
acknowledges that this role is indeed an important aspect of
the tort system. 1S3 However, he contends that the ALI Study
proposal was designed precisely to accomplish that goal,1S4 In
particular, the proposal requires that a defendant "seeking to
invoke compliance preclusion" must have "provided the regula
tory agency in a timely fashion with all relevant risk informa
tion in the defendant's possession regarding not only the risks
associated with its products and processes but also the means
of risk control, regardless of whether the regulatory program in
question imposes such an obligation."ls5 This requirement
would in his view allow plaintiffs' attorneys to be incentivized
to find potential wrongdoing. 1s6
As for the compensation role of the tort system, Professor
Stewart agrees that compensation may be an important socie
tal goal, given the fact that no drug is risk free. Nonetheless,
he contends that the tort system is an exceedingly inferior ap
proach to such compensation, especially compared to programs
such as the national vaccine compensation program. 1S7
Even if the tort system was the only option for compensa
tion, he rejects Professor Rabin's argument that it works.
First, it requires a strict liability standard, which is not what
most states, even those applying the "consumer expectations"
test, impose. ISS Rather, a finding of fault under such a test is
"tantamount to a determination that the product should never
have been marketed," contrary to the idea of providing compen
179 See id.
180Id.
181 See id. at 2180-81.
182 Id. at 2180.
183 See id. at 2179.
184 See id. at 2180.
185Id.
186 See id. at 2180-81.
187 See id. at 2181-82.
188 The consumer expectations test allows jurors to find a product defective if
it fails to meet consumers' expectations of safety. Id. at 2183.
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sation even for products with a positive risk-benefit ratio. 189
He also notes that the "consumer expectations" test is not ap
plicable to "technically complex" products, presumably includ
ing pharmaceuticals. 190 Finally, he points out that the "con
sumer expectations" test is simply not recognized in many
jurisdictions. 191
Professor Stewart provides a brief discussion of Professor
Rabin's concerns about off-label usage, risks that come up only
in the post-marketing time period, and over-promotions. 192 The
preclusion Stewart advocates applies only to regulated uses
(i.e., not off-label usage).193 Further, Stewart argues that the
disclosure requirement would create an incentive to disclose in
formation about post-marketing risks. 194
C. A MIDDLE GROUND: LEARNING FROM THE PATENT CONTEXT

Professors Rabin and Stewart present two different ap
proaches to FDA decisions in tort litigation. Comparing pat
ents and FDA approvals suggests a third way. The treatment
of issued patents in validity proceedings can be a model for the
treatment of approved pharmaceuticals in tort litigation. This
article contends that a policy that presumes safety and efficacy
is supported both as a matter of consistency between different
agency's decisions, and as a matter of policy because it resolves
or reduces many of the concerns of both Professors Rabin and
Stewart.
1. A Presumption of Safety and Efficacy

The factors that should be considered in determining how
to implement agency decisions in litigation include the strength
of the process at each agency, the interests furthered in litiga
tion, the interests and incentives among the parties involved,
and, most generally, the risks of an incorrect decision by the
agency. Therefore, when comparing the patent and FDA con
texts to decide whether the approach taken with issued patents
should be imported to the pharmaceutical tort context, these
factors must be evaluated. All but one of these factors support
giving FDA decisions at least the deference received by USPTO
at 2183-84.
at 2184-85.
See id. at 2185.
See id. at 2185-86.
See id. at 2186.
See id.

189Id.
190Id.
191
192
193
194
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patent grants. 195 While the evaluation is not merely checking
off boxes on a list and counting check marks, a brief summary
is helpful.
First, the FDA's review process is as comprehensive as the
USPTO's, regardless of the difference in scope of reviewed is
sues. 196 The questions the FDA is required to answer are cer
tainly more intense, and the process it goes through is more
thorough. The presumption of validity is based on approxi
mately twenty hours of consideration by the USPTO, whereas
hundreds or thousands of hours, including ongoing post
marketing approval analysis of the risk-benefit ratio, are per
formed by the FDA.
Second, the FDA's core mission is the protection of public
health, while the USPTO's mission is the issuance of patents.
This difference in goals may make a difference in results. Gen
erally, the FDA's client is the public, while the USPTO's client
is the applicant.197 The FDA is therefore likely to err on the
side of caution more often than the USPTO.
Third, the incentives of the applicants differ. A company
seeking approval of a pharmaceutical has incentives not to pur
sue a drug that may be unsafe. On the other hand, an inventor
pursuing a patent that might later be found invalid has few in
centives to abandon the application. 198
On the other hand, the issues at stake in the two contexts
do differ. The risks of a wrong decision are broader and more
psychologically significant in the context of drugs. An improper
approval of a drug can ultimately end in the loss of life. 199
Even with the difference in effects of wrong decisions, the two
systems are structured and operated in such a way that the
risk of a wrong decision taking place at the FDA is significantly
lower than at the USPTO. The systems are appropriately de
signed to reduce the odds of an unsafe drug making it through
the system while spending less effort on the prevention of inva
lid patents. 200
195 This discussion presumes that the presumption of validity is legitimate in
the patent context. As this article discusses above, there are those who be
lieve that it should be narrowed or eliminated, including the FTC. See supra
notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
196 See supra Part I.C.
197 See supra Part III.A.1-2.
198 See supra Part III.B.I-2. As noted previously, there are incentives to not
be dishonest in advocacy, which is where cost-shifting becomes a genuine risk.
199 See supra Part III.B.2.
200 See supra Part I.
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With these factors in mind, the disjunction in treatment
between approved patents and approved drugs makes little
sense. At a minimum, an FDA-approved drug should receive
comparable treatment to a patent issued by the USPTO. An
analysis of what constitutes comparable treatment follows.
First, recall what rights MegaPharma receives from an is
sued patent. MegaPharma's patent is presumed valid, and the
jury must conclude by clear and convincing evidence that it is
not valid in order to overcome the presumption. 201 This pre
sumption exists even when the party claiming invalidity is bas
ing its case on prior art not presented to the USPTO.202 Thus,
if GenerDrugs had one piece of highly relevant but obscure
prior art that the patent examiner had never found, Gener
Drugs would still be required to overcome the same presump
tion of validity. The fact-finder could consider a broad range of
evidence in making its determination, from prior art not pre
sented, to arguments made with respect to that prior art, and
finally to the persuasive power of the statements made in the
prosecution history resulting in the patent's issuance.
Treating FDA approval the same way would thus require a
broad presumption of safety and efficacy. In other words, the
jury would be instructed that once the FDA approved Phelox, it
is presumed to be safe and effective. Further, the jury would
be told that it must be convinced by clear and convincing evi
dence that the FDA's decision was wrong. As in the patent con
text, a broad range of evidence would be relevant to that de
termination, including any information not presented to the
FDA by MegaPharma,203 and information about risks that
arose after the most recent conclusion by the FDA that the
drug was safe and effective. 204
Perhaps more controversially, the presumption would be in
place whether or not the complaint involved on-label or off
label usage, or over-promotion. In either case, off-label usage
or over-promotion by the defendant would be considered, but,
201
202

203

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See 35 U.S.C. §282.

In the patent context, even what would roughly be considered fraud - e.g.,
the intentional nondisclosure of material prior art - must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence in order to render the patent unenforceable. See
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
204 Recall that the FDA reconsiders its submitted data, including adverse
event reports, any time there is an updated package insert in order to deter
mine if the product remains safe and effective.
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just as with unconsidered prior art in the patent context, it
would not make the presumption inapplicable. 205
The proposal set forth above may seem a bit sparse in de
tails. It does not include, for example, an exhaustive list offac
tors to put into jury instructions regarding the presumption,
nor does it set forth precisely how such a presumption would be
implemented. At this point, the goal of this article is merely to
provide a new starting point for a discussion. Moreover, an ad
vantage of a presumption, as opposed to outright preclusion, is
that it maintains a great deal of evidentiary flexibility. A
pharmaceutical trial implementing this presumption would
look very similar to those held today, except for the jury in
structions and arguments relating to those instructions. 206
2. Presumption of Safety and Efficacy-Addressing Concerns
about the Regulatory Compliance Defense
A rebuttable presumption of safety and efficacy for FDA
approved drugs provides a solution for some of the concerns ex
pressed by Professors Rabin and Stewart. First, the full pre
clusion urged by Stewart leaves potentially too small an incen
tive for the investigations that both Rabin and Stewart believe
are important. The problem is the one identified by Professor
Rabin: much "bad conduct" is only discovered through discovery
for more garden-variety torts. Making it somewhat harder to
prove negligence will reduce the number of marginal cases
where the evidence of a negative risk-benefit ratio is scant, but
still permits for successful suits when the FDA simply got it
wrong without any bad conduct by the drug's manufacturer.
Those suits will occasionally undercover bad conduct that out
side of the tort system would remain hidden.
Second, the increased burden of proof would provide an
other institutional improvement along with those ongoing im
This presumption of safety even in off-label usage is analogous to the fact
that even allegations that a patent is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct
still must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
206 This article's proposal differs from Texas's new statute that provides for a
limited set of bases for overcoming the presumption. See supra notes 123-25
and accompanying text.
The proposal also does not directly address punitive damages. Given this arti
cle's approach - and no obvious source from the patent context from which to
analogize - this article does not reach a conclusion about how FDA approval
should affect the availability of punitive damages, if at all. The addition of a
presumption of safety may well support making FDA approval at least a sig
nificant factor in, if not a bar to, the recovery of punitive damages. A full de
termination will have to wait for another day.
205
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provements discussed by Professor Rabin.207 If the plaintiff is
required to make its case by an increased burden of proof, a
judge may be more comfortable in taking the Daubert and
Kumho Tire decisions seriously, and dismissing baseless cases.
This increased burden of proof would help give a judge a
greater sense of security in connection with appeals as well.
Third, though Professor Stewart's point that the tort sys
tem is an imprecise means for providing compensation is
sound, to whatever extent its role for compensation is impor
tant, this proposal maintains it.
Fourth, the presumption of safety and efficacy maintains a
significant incentive for the drug sponsors to keep the FDA
fully apprised of data regarding drugs, and to keep the package
insert updated. The presumption would be "renewed" each
time the FDA renewed its safety and efficacy determination.
Furthermore, the company's compliance or noncompliance with
data-sharing requirements should be a factor in deciding
whether or not to disregard the FDA's conclusions.
Finally, the presumption of safety and efficacy provides the
flexibility lacking in outright preclusion. In each case, a judge
may determine if the situation is relevant to the presumption,
or even provide specific jury instructions on the topic.
V. CONCLUSION
A presumption of safety and efficacy for FDA-approved
pharmaceuticals is supported by comparing the FDA's system
to the USPTO's system. It maintains the basic outlines of the
current tort system, but requires additional evidence to obtain
a recovery. Moreover, it expressly tells the jury that the FDA
decision is to be presumed correct. It provides judges with ad
ditional power to determine liability before trial and put expert
testimony to the test. It maintains the accepted role of the tort
system as a public safeguard in the development and market
ing of drugs. Finally, it treats determinations of two agencies,
the USPTO and FDA, consistently. A presumption of safety
and efficacy would allow pharmaceutical regulation and phar
maceutical litigation to work in harmony to promote the safe
and efficient development and marketing of pharmaceuticals.

207

See supra Part IV.A.

